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The channels of human infection may be inferred from a consideration of the tetiology of the disease. As regards aetiology the following are axioms:-; (1) The bubonic form of plague is hardly infectious from person to person in the absence of fleas.
(2) Human plague is initiated in a rat infection.
(3) Plague spreads to the human being from fleas of dead rats. (4) Rats of necessity live in proximity to food. The data are quite simple, they are fundamental. Some ten years ago I had occasion to say, " Excuse me, sir, you are standing on a rat." The rat had only been two hours dead, but several other dead had been taken from the same corner-a rat warren, an old cesspool filled in with loose bricks, and these covered with the chaff and other droppings from a grain elevator belt which ran above it-some hours previously. Axiomatically this was a dangerous corner; within a few days the interested examiner of this spot was down with a right maxillary bubo. A little later on, one Monday, a disinfector worker told me that the disinfecting shed was leaping with fleas and that he had been badly bitten; four days after this complaint he presented a left maxillary bubo, very painful, very diffuse, and accompanied by high fever.
Both were comparatively mild cases of plagie; both were convalescent in less than a week.
A few days before the disinfection out of which the case in the disinfector worker arose, a man was brought to me on a ship, suffering from a femoral bubo; on search, his leg showed no septic point nor sign of recent sepsis and he was ill; he was removed as a case of suspected plague on my hearing that there was a rat mortality on the ship. Microscopic evidence was obtained in this case forthwith.
Dead rats, and a bubo otherwise unaccountable and accompanied by illness in a human being, seemed to be the simple indication of plague occurring in non-epidemic regions.
The duties of the patient in the last case led him into No. 1 hold of his ship in which there was a rat mortality. The food stores, of which he had the handling, were disposed in a space separated off by battening only from the hold proper.
Three days previously to the occurrence of this case, a man from another ship had died of plague.' The ships belonged to the same company-thele had been found on discharge a rat mortality in the No. 1 hold of either ship; the second ship had taken grain cargo from the same pile as the first at Bombay, and this fact is the only possible connexion between the two cases on the two ships. Thus it seemed that foodstuffs carried as cargoes from an infected port should render a ship suspect of rat infection, and that the man whose duty it is to handle the foodstuffs in the food stores of an infected ship is of the whole crew the most liable to come into contact with dead rats and their living fleas and acquire the infection.
I have unfolded the subject as it presented itself to me then, in the light of a few experiences and a close study of the reports of the Indian Plague Commission.
The essential connexion between food and rats had its ample illustration in every part of the world during the war. It was the Ministry of Food which, in consequence of rodent depredation, issued the Rat Orders of 1918, 1919, and these orders were the precursors of the Rats and Mice Destruction Act. During the late war and early after-war period food stocks were stored everywhere and anyhow, in the absence of bottoms to carry them for distribution or against emergencies. Ships were heavily provisioned either for transport of troops or with a view to protracted voyages and the avoidance of provisioning in places where food might be hardly obtained.
If plague, food and the rat be considered together, on theoretical grounds the late threat of plague invasion in various parts of the world and in England is accounted for. Rats were everywhere increased in number by the unwonted food storage. Thereby endemic centres of plague were rendered more dangerous, ships more communicative and the wide world, especially at its ports, more receptive. During 1917-18-19-20, eight ships brought plague infection into the Port of London, and afforded the opportunity for comparisons here laid before you. 
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I present a list of successive plague-infected ships showing how prone to attack is the food storekeeper. The ship's name, the number of cases occurring on board, the rating of the first case and the total complement, are given. By " storekeeper " is intended to mean that person who went regularly into the store room for the purpose of distribution of rations. In the ships numbered 1 and 3 this man was a white officer, in numbers 7 and 8 he was a Lascar and native of Japan respectively. Ship number 4 is an exception in that the storekeeper was not the first man down but as will be seen later he was in this case not the person most intimately associated with the food store. You will recall how the provision' merchant in Ainsworth's " Old St. Paul's" shut himself in with his stores to avoid the plague-under the circumstances an incorrect procedure, but fictionally successful.
Here, out of over 1,715 persons presumably exposed, with thirty-nine cases of plague, no less than eight of the cases occurred in food storekeepers and their assistants.
It is obvious that the food store is a potential focus of danger, and it will be interesting to examine the location of the store on some of the ships affected in connexion with the berthing of the cases of plague.
IThe following are the circumstances of the Somali infection: The ship had a complement of 469 souls. Out of these the disease selected in succession the storekeeper, the storekeeper's assistant, a lavatory attendant and an engineer. The three -first cases were all berthed forward. The storeroom, from which many dead rats had been thrown out, was situated amidships in the lower 'tween deck of No. I hold and was not rat-proofed against the hold space. The fourth case was berthed in the port alleyway and the door to the stairway of the infected storeroom opened into the alleyway opposite his cabin. The third case-that of the lavatory attendant, may need a little straining of the imagination, but not so to anyone who knows the intimate association between a rat community and their nearest source of water supply. The lavatory was situated in the port alleyway, a few doors up from the opening to the storeroom, in which fact lay the danger which beset the lavatory attendant. The incidence of the disease in the ship's complement no less than the history of the dead rats found-eighty dead were thrown out-indicated the storeroom as the source of danger. The storeroom cat took the disease but recovered after the suppuration in the cervical region; its illness coincided in point of time with that of the storekeeper whose pet it was. Conisidering that out of a complement of 469 souls, these four men were selected by the disease we may conclude that the ship is an illustration of the fact that habitually to enter the storeroom or to spend a large portion of the watch, whether on duty or on the watch below, in its proximity, determines the incidence. Every hold contained rats which had died of plague, but the storeroom was the focus of human infection. S.S. Hector was provided with temporary poop quarters containing an improvised food store, a gunner, a signalman and a lamp trimmer. They became infected in succession. The men complained of smells and the food store adjacent to their quarters was cleared of deadrats. The cases on this ship comprised these three men first, then the storekeeper and his assistant, who were berthed amidships well away from the store. But for the provisional living quarters erected in the poop the storekeepers would have probably afforded the first and only cases. The complement was fifty-nine all told, and was lodged-the crew in forecastles and officers amidships. S.S. Nagoya had seven cases, all in her port forecastle-the native food stores opened by a trap into this port forecastle-the storekeeper and his assistant were the first cases and the position of the food store very evidently determined the incidence of this outbreak. The firemen in the starboard forecastle were not infected, nor any others of a complement of 413.
S.S. Alps Maru4 had arrived in dock before the outbreak. The cook was the selected victim; but it transpired that he had only been cook one day before his illness began and two days before diagnosis; he had previously been and still practically was the food storekeeper. I saw on this ship a rat lying in the officers' bath-room, where it had died, this observation recalling the case of the lavatory attendant on the Somali, and emphasizing the necessity of water to the rat and the danger of the neighbourhood of a water supply in case of rat infections on board. In other ships the human incidence of the disease was greatest in the neighbourhood of the food store; but other considerations entered into the outbreak.
I am unable to put before you a list of dates which show the time which elapsed between presumed infection of the ship and the onset of the first human case because of the difficulty of determining the place of infection. Some facts however emerge from a consideration of dates. S.S. Sardinia left Bombay on March 23; the first case occurred on April 27, thirty-five days later and only seven days before the ship entered the Port of London. The ship stayed at Marseilles from April 13 to April 16 for discharge of cargo. Cargo was discharged at Gibraltar on April 22 also. At Marseilles, as is customary when 500 tons Dr more of cargo is to be landed from a ship coming from an infected port, a fumigation was carried out while the cargo was in the holds. Dead rats were thrown out of the food store, which was situated in front of the collision bulkhead, soon after the ship left Marseilles; the Marseilles fumigation could not be accountable for the death of these rats except in the secondary way of having either chased them there to die, or having chased infected rats amongst a non-infected rat community in the storeroom. 0 I infer that the Marseilles fumigation was the disturbing factor in this ship, where a rat infection had been simmering in the hold and was brought out into the open by the fumigation. A human case occurring eleven days later, infection must have followed closely on this interference with the comfort of the rat community in the holds. It must be noted however that the hatches had been opened and cargo discharged, so that the disturbance of the rats may not have been due solely to the fumigation. This ship has features common to many, which explain the path of infection and the danger of ill-considered attempts at disinfestations. The watertight (collision) bulkhead absolutely shuts off the fore peak from the hold. But the chain-locker is not so shut off; it lies behind the bulkhead, it drains into the bilges, it opens by a hatch into lower forecastle quarters, and any fumigation in the hold would presumably drive rats into the chain-locker and up the chain and chain pipes or up the hatch. Two cases occurred in the lower forecastle 'quarters, into which the chain-locker hatch opened, one in the port forecastle, three in the starboard forecastle, and one, a storekeeper, lived opposite the port forecastle door.
On S.S. Matiana it was a month after leaving Bombay and a week after leaving Delagoa Bay that the first human case occurred. At Delagoa Bay a fumigation of the fore holds had been attempted in the presence of cargo, and the suspicion is again aroused that eviction of infected rats rather than disinfestation of the hold resulted. The arrangement of the chain-locker approach on S.S. Matiana was such that the starboard forecastle would receive infected rats by way of a hatch from the chain-locker opening into the forecastle floor from just behind the collision bulkhead.
S.S. Nagoya has a rat history which shows that from London to Yokohama and back again a rat infection existed on board. She had a complement of over 400 persons and no case of plague was found on board between the middle of June and October 25. A solitary case of "influenza " excited suspicion, especially as this was solitary and ended in death. The case was seen by many doctors and the diagnosis remained undisturbed from August 14 when death occurred, to October 25. On this date several more cases of similar diagnosis were found to be plague. On October 15 the ship had been fumigated at Marseilles as is customary in circumstances already alluded to; on October 21, six days later, the first case of plague occurred in the forecastle. Three dead rats brought from the food store in the fore peak were seen by me. The pupae of flies on these showed them to have been dead-presumably from plague-from a time which antedates the Marseilles fumigation; yet the Marseilles fumigation may have concentrated the infection in the fore peak and precipitated or intensified the attack.
A weak fumigation by sulphur dioxide is one of the greatest disturbances to which hold rats can be subjected. The vapour pours down any broad channels to the bottom of the hold by mass displacement of air and if sufficient time and concentration of the gas be used, it is lethal to rats. But on S.S. Nagoya passengers were located in the upper "'tween decks," i.e., in the holds, and they returned to their quarters very quickly after the fumigation, thus showing how feeble was the strength or quantity of sulphur dioxide admixture poured in. No doubt it was stronger for a time in the lower parts. of the hold-sufficiently strong to kill some rats perhaps, and to drive out the remainder. The purpose of the French authorities may thereby be served;
but the comparison of the three vessels, Sardinia, Matiana and Nagoya shows, I think that such a measure as incomplete fumigation of holds in the presence of a suspected rat infection is liable to precipitate the human infection which, given time, might or might not otherwise occur.
Another disturbance to which the rats will certainly be subjected is due to the discharge of cargo. It must be the history of many a vessel that the rat infection or rat mortality does not show during the voyage but is found in the hold on discharge of cargo at the port of arrival. Similarly rat infection must exist on occasion without being found. I hold this belated discovery and want of discovery to be the reason for repeated small rat mortalities which may occur ashore in any port trading with endemic centres of plague. Although the human element is too serious to be welcomed as an index of danger, it -must be recognized that the declaration of human cases has been a safeguard to the port of London in at least seven of the ships here dealt with. The disturbance of infected rats by cargo discharge is dangerous to the ship's complement first, then to the inhabitants of the port of discharge.
In the cases of S.S. Clan Lamnont and S.S. Alps Marn, the ships had actually arrived before the human case of plague occurred. Now allow for a little extension of the time before the human case develops and the ship may have sailed to another port before discovery, and thus give the port of discharge undeserved disrepute. The case of the Nagoya shows how the infection in its living carriers may hang on in the obscurity of the hold for months.
Delayed human outbreaks which occur in consequence of discharge of cargo may account for many otherwise obscure cases. I do not know the circumstances sufficiently fully to detail them, but I have in mind a ship that sailed to Canada and discharged her cargo there; she discharged her case of human plague at Bristol; also the ship that discharged her Bombay cargo at Wellington and brought her case of plague back to the Indian neighbourhood from which the infection probably originated. A voyage is usually reckoned from the port of homeward lading for sanitary purposes, but it is evident from the case of the Nagoya that in investigating the history of plague on any ship. the outward voyage, or even the previous voyage, may have to be taken into account. The point is, that disturbance of the hold is often the beginning of the transfer of rat infection to man and even on such disturbance the transfer may be long delayed.
I have tried to elucidate the question as to the number of rats on a ship which may give rise to an outbreak of plague ; as with bacilli in milk and in sewage-contaminated water, number is of small importance as compared with quality. 
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In the list I present some numbers with regard to rats on infected ships -which indicate that human outbreaks occur where comparatively few rats are concerned. This is especially remarkable in the instance of the ship Hector, where the rat history only includes twenty-eight rats. The conditions on this ship, however, were such that on examination of the manifest it was at once surmised there were but few rats on board: the cargo was almost completely " non-ratty," foodstuffs for rats were absent. The "'tween decks " of No. 4 hold contained a vegetable locker reached by means of the hatchway, at which point the hold rats were actually fed and petted by the crew. The rats were forced by circumstances either to come on deck to obtain solid nutriment at the galley or foodstore, or to take up their quarters permanently above the main deck. I was unable to obtain the number of rats found dead in the holds on fumigation but the number of dead found on discharge of cargo was only 16. This may be contrasted with the Somali and the Alps Maru, on which 103 and 57 respectively were found dead during discharge of cargo. The Alps Maru was not completely discharged at this port and no search was made; the number 57 would be presumably increased had the scrutiny been thorough.
It should be understood that the policy pursued in the case of each ship was to pass the cargo overside into barges, under conditions which it was hoped and, I think, proven, would make the transfer of rats from ship to shore unlikely, if not impossible, and to disinfect the ship only when the holds were empty. On a plague-infected ship rats found dead during discharge can be piesumed to have died of plague, their condition as to putrefaction would show to some extent whether there was recent infection and their situation and numbers the extent of the infection.
The full observation of the rat conditions was found impossible under the conditions of hurry inseparable from shipping during and immediately after the war; column four could not be fully completed, where the numbers are given the tale is probably underestimated. For instance, on two ships, in fumigating the holds, certain cabins situated on the main deck could be filled with fumes from the hold; indeed it was unnecessary to place pots of sulphur in them. They were cabins, similarly situated on both ships, opposite the food store entrance in the port alleyways. On one of these ships rats-dead ratsgave evidence of their presence in and caused complaint from the occupants of the cabin after fumigation.. However, the rats were dead, and I confess to little concern about the nuisance under the circumstances. It was rather of the greatest interest that a main deck could give exit to rats from a hold through its substance, and that exits should show themnlves in being and in use in the neighbourhood of a food store and not elsewhere. Neither plating nor wood deck remain rat-proof at the ship's side ; when the plating works away or where there is no tight fit about the angles, the wood will eventually be pierced if the elaboration of a run be convenient to the rat.
Section of Epidemiology and State Medicine
It is not a difficult matter to get evidence as to a rat mortality on an infected ship at the time of entry into port by questioning the persons likely to know, and the proper persons at present are those who are brought into contact with the rat. The rat history was quite clear to those in authority on the ships Matiana, Somali, Hector and Alps Marmc after the human event. On S.S. Nagoya the natives who suffered from plague knew what the malady was, but those in authority apparently did not know-a rat mortality was in good faith denied as regards the storeroom, though not for the rest of the ship; but the issuer of stores was dead, and I think he must have known of the rat mortality in his little domain.
The recent Orders of the Ministry of Health place a duty on the Master or Officer in Charge of a ship of notifying a rat mortality on board whenever found. I hope that in time the importance of the matter will be fully realized by shipmasters, and that they will inform themselves from time to time of the state of their ship (and especially of their store-room) as to rat mortality, when trading with infected ports. A favourable opportunity for finding indication in the holds exists during discharge of cargo.
On two of the ships infection of one of the crew on board has followed the arrival of the vessels in port. These represent failures of the measures taken. In one case a limited rat infection of a dock followed: this also represents a failure. As time has gone on the following measures have commended themselves as a complete programme of precautions:-
(1) The yessel is moored in the stream pending complete discharge of cargo and complete fumigation.
(2) The passengers are discharged under " surveillance."
(3) The crew is reduced to a skeleton minimum, and is placed under " surveillance " or " observation." (4) The infected quarters, living quarters of the crew and food stores, with all their contents, are subjected to an immediate six hours' fumigation, under a 2'3 per cent. atmosphere of sulphur dioxide (2 lb. sulphur burned to 1,000 cubic ft.).
(5) The crew standing by the ship is berthed as far as possible from foci of infection (food stores), and the quarters subjected to refumigation at least once a week pending the final fumigation.
Vaccination is urged on the crew. (6) The cargo is discharged under precautions against transfer of rats. Every package is examined from this point of view. Barges are only allowed alongside during daylight hours.
(7) The workers wear one-piece overalls tied in at the sleeves and ankles against the attacks of fleas, and are under ",surveillance." (8) When empty of cargo the whole of the closed spaces on the ship are placed simultaneously under sulphur dioxide: 2 lb. of sulphur burned to the 1,000 cubic ft. is more than ample for the purpose in view if the spaces are properly sealed. If six hours can be obtained for the disinfestation usually twelve or more can; the longer the process the more certain the effects as regards fleas and bacteria.
(9) A deck rat hunt is instituted while fumigation is in progress.
You will notice the absence of mention of vaccination of the cargo workers and of the removal of the patients with their effects and bedding. With regard to the latter point no bedding or clothing should go ashore with the patient, not even his own shirt and blanket, these should be left on board until Willouahby: Plague on Shipboard after the preliminary fumigation, as a measure of protection to the matron and nurses of the hospital and the disinfector operator. From experience, I look upon this precaution of the immediate preliminary fumigation of infected quarters and their flea-infected contents as being of the utmost importance to the crew on the one hand and to the hospital and disinfecting staff on the other. It is the attention to detail in the measures suggested which confers success on the long and expensive operation of dealing with a plague-infected ship. Unless this attention can be assured, the operation might as well be shortened by the application of the Clayton apparatus to a full hold, with the attendant disadvantages of insecurity in the result and probable damage to cargo by reason of the long period and large amount of gas which must be used to secure any effective penetration.
A 75 percentage of efficiency in rat destruction even on a non-infected ship should not be enough to procure a certificate stating any satisfaction in the method or course pursued, and on an infected ship it simply constitutes inefficiency. It is obvious that where rat infection is presumed, no disturbance of the hold should be undertaken without simultaneous fumigation of the crew's quarters.
In conclusion, of the cases admitted to Denton Hospital, I would mention two that seem to be of epidemiological interest. One boy was admitted with septiceemia: for three days he was in intense distress by reason of a pleurisy involving almost the whole of the membrane indicated; a left femoral bubo then appeared, and he recovered without development of pulmonary signs.
The other case was mildly septicmemic without further symptom for seven days: he then developed a cough with blood-stained sputum and pleurisy; the sputa were loaded with plague bacilli; at the time of his death, twenty-four hours later, a condition of massive cervical cedema had been established. I suppose such a type of case to be the connecting link between the bubonic and the pneumonic epidemics, should conditions of overcrowding or other close contact permit of droplet infection so as to continue the pneumonic type.
DISCUSSION.
Dr. W. D. BETENSON said he had been interested in the history of the cats on these ships. He said that Jehangir, the Mogul Emiiperor of Delhi, 1605-27, in his famous imeinoirs, had written of the plague at Agra in 1619: " The daughter of Asof Khan the elder, tells mle and insists upon its truth, that one day in the courtyard of her house a rat was observed, rising and falling in a distracted state. It was running about after the manner of drunkards, not knowing where to go. She said to one of her girls, 'Take it by the tail and throw it to the cat.' And the cat was delighted. It seized it but instantly dropped it. Then the cat became ill but recovered. The girl, however, died next day. Seven or eight people died also and so many were ill that they went into the garden from the lodging. In brief, in the space of nine days, seventeen people became travellers on the road of annihilation." A contemporaneous writer added: " If the people of that house had left it altogether and gone into the country they would have been saved, but owing to that step not being taken the whole town was destroyed."
With regard to the question of spread of plague by the cat Dr. Betenson narrated the following facts: The storekeeper of the S.S. Somali had two cats, one of which had swellings under the jaw about May 5, 1918. It was missing for three days and then returned, the swellings having broken and matter exuding. The storekeeper was laid up with plague two days later. This cat w%as killed May 30 and was then fat and in good condition, the gland under the right jaw was inflamed, otherwise the animal appeared to be healthy. The gland, spleen, heart and lungs were sent for bacteriological examiination. The second cat was at this time missing buit Nas found and killed oIn Alay 31. The bacteriological report was: " In specimens fromll both cats plague-like organismlis were found in smears, particularly numerous in the smears from the lungs.
But no plague bacilli could be obtained either by culture or by animal inoculation. The diagnosis is therefore negative as to plague." On the S.S. Japan complaint was made by the passengers of a cat having lumps around the neck and not being well. The cat disappeared but a few days later it returned and further cornplaint was made about the fur around the neck being in a " messy'" condition. It was not proved that this cat had suffered from plague either. Dr. Betenson said that cats and dogs were attacked by plague but usually recovered and it was a question whether this partial iimnunity did not defeat the bacteriologist. As to the question of the relationship between pneumonic and bubonic plague, judging from his experience in India and Johannesburg, the epidemic outbreak began with pneumonic, and continued with bubonic cases.
Rear-Admiral Sir PERCY BASSETT-SMITH said that as he had been for the first two years of the plague epidemic, stationed at Bombay in one of H.M. ships, and acting as Senior Medical Officer, the prevention of the introduction into the Fleet had been of the most extreme importance, particularly as the crews consisted of numbers of Lascars and Goanese, besides the Europeans. Having first ascertained that the rats, which were in great abundance in the ship, were free from plague, he had considered it of first importance to minimize, as far as possible, the danger of the men contracting it on shore and bringing it on board. Consequently all-night leave had been stopped and careful inspections of the crews had been frequently made. During this period of two years there had been only two cases and in both of these infection had been contracted when the men were on shore and did not return to the ship. On renmoval of the parent ship to the docks for annual repair, great anxiety had been caused as the grain stores in the docks, at first, bad contained thousands of rats, numbers of these dying daily. The ordinary rat-stopping devices had been placed on the cables and hawsers and appeared to be effective. Ile was rather surprised, that in the cases quoted by Dr. Willoughby, submaxillary buboes had been present yet the cases had been mild and had recovered. At Bombay, submaxillary and cervical buboes had been generally looked upon as most fatal signs. It would appear that the virulence of the infection found in the English cases had been less intense. The prevention of introduction into the ship wsas far more important to them' than the treatment and disposal of cases afterwuards. It niight be of interest to mention that in North China the figure of a cat, red on black ground, was used as a charm against plague by the inhabitants.
Mr. GLANVILL CORNEY observed that mention had been made of cervical and submaxillary bubo occurring, with general signs of malaise, in cats, on board ships where there were plague-infected rats; but that no plague bacilli had been revealed, after slaughter, in the bodies of the cats in question. In a colonial port where the presence of plague-infected rats was being strictly watched for (but where no human cases had ever occurred) several cases of submaxillary adenitis in cats, psually running on to suppuration, if not quickly relieved, had come under his notice. These had invariably been found to be due to the impaction of one or more bearded grass seeds in the cat's buccal Imiucous membrane. On the removal of the offending seed by means of forceps the cats had always recovered quickly. No evidence of plague 'infection had ever been found in them. Last summer an exactly similar case had been illet with near Maidstone. Grass seeds would not be likely to find their way into a ship's holds; but other irritating objects picked up by a cat's fur could easily pass into the mouth, on the animal licking itself clean, and set up similar trouble.
Mr. A. W. BACOT remarked on the perfunctory maanner in which the quarantine regulations appeared to be applied in some British ports abroad. At a West African port he had seen them utilized in what seemed to be a disciplinary rather than an hygienic spirit. A mail boat which had visited Daccar during an outbreak of plague proceeded to moor at the usual anchorage solmie 300 to 400 yards from the shore instead of at the quarantine station much farther out. When signalled to comply with the regulations she lifted her anchor and again dropped it within about 100 yards, and S-Ep la shore parties were at once allowed to board her while lighters went alongside for the discharge of baggage, &c. It seemi-ed a pity to trouble the officers of the steamller at all unless the regulations were to be rigidly enforced and in that case the regulations ought to be frequently mrodified to bring themii into line with the mlost recent knowledge of the different ship-borne diseases.
Lieutenant-Colonel WILKINSON asked Dr. Willoughby what mllethod he found most satisfactory for the fumiigation of ships. He understood that a Clayton apparatus had formerly been used in the Port of London, and in view of the increased attention now given to the fumiigation of vessels both in this country and abroad, it would be a great advantage to have an opinion based upon so large an experience as that of Dr. Willoughby as to the advantage or otherwise of this apparatus as coilmpared, for examlple, with the burning of sulphur in pots.
Dr: WVILLOUGHBY replied as to the method of fumigation of ships. Any lethal gas which did not announce its presence immediately was not worth practical consideration. Hydrocyanic gas was excellently lethal but sulphur dioxide was at present the only fumaigant fulfilling all the desiderata. It was a matter of little importance how the sulphur dioxide atmosphere was obtained, whether from burning candles, by mechanical distribution, or from the pure sulphur dioxide in tins. In empty ships, properly sealed as regards each space under fumiiigation, distribution was assured by the rapidity and completeness of diffusion. Diffusion was theoretically somewhat delayed in the expansion of pure sulphur dioxide fromn tins, the atmosphere formed being heavy and cold. Tins were useful in fulmigations on oil tank steaimiers. The Clayton apparatus was a good one for rapid distribution of a lethal atmosphere, especially the illachine designed to throw a 15 per cent. gas. The 3 per cent. machine was not fool proof because of the ease with which its limitations, heat production and sublimation, were reached, with a resultant tendency to the working of the nmachine at a low percentage. The constant and skilled attention necessary was difficult to secure. So slmlall a percentage of sulphur dioxide however was necessary to the killing of rats that the 3 per cent. iiachine, though not worked to its limilit, was perfectly effective. Attention should be rather paid to the effective sealing of the quarters or holds than to the simllple question of the percentage atmosphere: 0 5 per cent. atm-losphere maintained over four to six hours easily killed a rat. One lb. of sulphur in burning produced a 118 per cent. atmosphere in 1,000 cubic ft. Therefore 1 lb. of sulphur to 1,000 cubic ft. was lethal and absolute if sealing were effective; 2 lb. per 1,000 cubic ft. was over-caution but allowed for human error; 3 lb. was waste of material for efficiency, and efficiency of course imiplied supervision. Rat destruction was m-lost easily accomplished by the burning of sulphur in prepared 1 lb. candles. The candles were disposed in suitable numlibers in each space to be fumfigated, lit and the spaces sealed. Nothing further need be done; the fumigation " did " itself. Where, for the process, six hours sealing could be obtained onl a ship twelve to twenty-four could usually be secured. At the end of twelve hours the hold would still be unapproachable by human beings until means for clearing the gas were used. The methods in use in the Port of London were the Clayton 3 per cent. apparatus and the candle process; they were equally effective and absolute for rat destruction. Dr. Willoughby was of opinion that the simple process was made unnecessarily mysterious, and that it should be a domestic lmlatter for the shipping com-lpanies to carry into execution the directions of the Sanitary Authority, while orders, advice and the effective supervision of that execution were the Port Sanitary Authority's true functions in mere rat destruction on ships. Where plague was suspected or proven this supervision would still be the only skilled portion of the work of rat destruction. Every hole and cranny on the ships deck, even the hollow winch barrels, should be subjected to systematic search while the closed quarters and holds were under simultaneous fumigation.
